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ABSTRACT
An online truthful budgeted matching problem is considered for
a bipartite graph, where the right vertices are available ahead of
time, and individual left vertices arrive sequentially. On arrival of
a left vertex, its edge utilities (or weights) to all the right vertices
and a corresponding cost (or bid) are revealed. If a left vertex is
matched to any of the right vertices, then it has to be paid at least
as much as its cost. The problem is to match each left vertex in-
stantaneously and irrevocably to any one of the right vertices, if at
all, to find the maximum weight matching that is truthful, under a
payment budget constraint. Truthfulness condition requires that no
left vertex has any incentive of misreporting its cost. Assuming that
the vertices arrive in an uniformly random order (secretary model)
with arbitrary utilities, a truthful algorithm is proposed that is 24β-
competitive (where β is the ratio of the maximum and the mini-
mum utility) and satisfies the payment budget constraint. Direct
applications of this problem include crowdsourcing auctions, and
matching wireless users to cooperative relays in device-to-device
enabled cellular network.
1. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by applications in crowdsourcing and device-to-device
(D2D) communication, we consider an online bipartite matching
problem over a bipartite graph G(L ∪ R,E), where the right ver-
tex set R is known ahead of time, while left vertices of L arrive
sequentially in a random order. The incident edge utilities from a
vertex ℓ ∈ L to set R are revealed only upon its arrival, as well
as its cost cℓ, and the problem is to decide which vertex of R to
match with ℓ, if at all, immediately and irrevocably. If vertex ℓ is
matched, a payment pℓ is made to vertex ℓ that has to be at least
as much as its reported cost cℓ. A total budget constraint of B is
assumed for payments to be made to the matched left vertices. We
assume that left vertices are strategic players, which could poten-
tially manipulate the reporting of their true cost, and hence seek a
truthful algorithm, i.e., such that no incoming vertex has incentive
to misreport its cost.
The considered problem is a truthful generalization of the on-
line knapsack problem, where each item has a value and a weight,
and the problem is to accept each item instantaneously and irre-
vocably, so as to maximize the sum of the values of the accepted
items subject to a sum-weight constraint. If all left vertices in our
problem are truthful, then keeping pℓ = cℓ satisfies the truthfulness
constraint, and the considered problem specializes to the knapsack
problem with knapsack size of B. The best known algorithm for
the online knapsack problem is a 10e-competitive algorithm [1].
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The considered problem is a special case of a reverse auction [2],
where users submit bids for accomplishing a set of tasks and if se-
lected, expect a payment at least as much as their reported bids.
The generality is in not enforcing the one-to-one matching con-
straint, i.e., one user can do more than one task, or any task can
be assigned to more than one user. Budget feasible mechanisms
have been introduced in [3] for reverse auctions (set R is made of a
single vertex). For the offline problem, with a matching constraint
similar to this paper, a 3-approximate algorithm has been derived
in [4] that is one-sided truthful. When the goal is to maximize the
number of assigned tasks, [5] provides a 320-competitive truthful
algorithm assuming the secretary-input model.
Some important applications of the considered problem are in
crowdsourcing and device-to-device (D2D) communication, that is
expected to be part of modern wireless communication standards.
For crowdsourcing applications, a platform advertises a set of tasks
it wants to accomplish and multiple users successively bid for com-
pleting those tasks and expect some payment towards that end. The
job of the platform is to select the set of users that maximize its
utility under a total budget constraint. If the platform is not careful
in selecting its payment strategy, bidders have an incentive to mis-
report their costs [6, 7], and therefore we seek a truthful algorithm
for matching users to tasks and decide on corresponding payments.
From a D2D communication perspective, consider a single base
station (BS) and a set of users U that are connected to that BS. Let
R ⊆ U be the set of active users, while the remaining L = U\R
are inactive but can potentially help users of set R to relay their
communication to/from the BS, as envisaged in future networks.
For any inactive user ℓ ∈ L, the set of active users it can help
is R(ℓ) ⊆ R and at any time it can only help any one user from
R(ℓ). Since relaying requires ℓ to spend some of its resources, e.g.,
battery, it is natural to assume that ℓ expects some payment for its
help, and submits a corresponding bid at the time of advertising its
inactive state and ability to help. The job of the BS is to allocate
at most one helper (matching) from set L for each user in set R,
and decide the corresponding payment that is at least as much as
the bid of that user in L. Clearly, there is incentive for users in set
L to misreport their bids in order to extract more payments and this
motivates the need to seek truthful matching algorithm.
The main contribution of this paper is a 24β-competitive ran-
domized matching algorithm that is truthful and satisfies the pay-
ment budget constraint, where β is the ratio of the largest to the
smallest utility of any edge. To keep the problem non-degenerate,
similar to other prior related works on online algorithms [1, 8], we
consider a secretarial input model, where the order of arrival of left
vertices is uniformly random, but their utilities and bids can be arbi-
trary or even adversarial. Under this model, we modify the offline
algorithm [4] and then use the sample and price algorithm [1] to
make the algorithm online, where the novelty is in terms of defin-
ing the price for each right vertex and the corresponding payment
for any left vertex that is matched to the right vertex. To contrast
with the online knapsack problem, which we noted is a special
case where truthfulness is guaranteed, the price of truthfulness is
24β/10e in terms of competitiveness.
2. ONLINE TRUTHFUL BUDGETED
MATCHING
Let G = (L∪R,E) be a bipartite graph with left vertices L, and
right vertices R, and edge set E. The utility or weight of each edge
e is u(e). For a set of edges E′, its utility is u(E′) =
∑
e∈E′ u(e).
Each left vertex ℓ has an associated cost or bid cℓ, that does not
depend on the right vertex r. We denote c(e) = cℓ as the cost/bid
of edge e = (ℓ, r). If a left vertex ℓ is matched to a right vertex
r, then a minimum payment of cℓ has to be made to user ℓ, with
an overall budget constraint of B. Let umax = maxe u(e) and
umin = mine u(e). We assume that umaxumin ≤ β . Moreover, we
also assume the typical large market assumption [4], i.e., umax
u∗
is
small, where u∗ is the optimal sum-utility of the matching under the
budget constraint. Thus, no single user can influence the outcome
significantly.
Remark 1. As shown in [6], if bids of left vertices are used as pay-
ments, there is incentive for left vertices to misreport their bids, and
consequently the mechanism is not truthful or incentive compatible.
Thus, the payment strategy is non-trivial.
In this work, we consider the online problem, where the set R of
right vertices is known ahead of time, while the left vertices of set
L arrive sequentially in time and reveal their edge set (and utilities)
incident on the right vertices together with their bid. On each left
vertex arrival, it has to be matched irrevocably to any one of the
unmatched right vertex at that time, if at all. If a left vertex is
matched, then the payment to be made to it is also decided at the
time of its arrival that cannot be changed later.
To keep the problem non-degenerate in terms of competitive ra-
tio, we assume that the order of arrival of left vertices is uniformly
random, that is each permutation of left vertices is equally likely.
As a result, the objective is to find a truthful algorithm with constant
expected competitive ratio under the payment budget constraint of
B. The weights (utilities), however, are allowed to be selected by
an adversary.
Before considering the online scenario, we first discuss the of-
fline (all left vertices and their edges are available non-causally)
case, and define the optimal fractional solution (matching under
budget constraint) to be OPT(B). Note that for defining OPT, we
are using raw bids as payments and truthfulness is not required. We
note an important property for OPT(B) whose proof is immediate.
Lemma 1. For α ≤ 1, u(OPT(B)) ≤ 1
α
u(OPT(αB)).
For the offline scenario, we propose a THRESHOLD algorithm
that is inspired (a modified version) by the UNIFORMMECHANISM
algorithm [4], where the GREEDY subroutine is the usual greedy
matching algorithm for a bipartite graph. We define for each edge
e = (ℓ, r) a buck per bang b(e) = c(e)
u(e)
that represents the cost per
unit utility. For any γ, let G(γ) be the graph obtained by removing
all edges e ∈ E(G) with buck per bang b(e) > γ.
The main idea behind the THRESHOLD algorithm is to find the
largest threshold γB , (subject to budget constraint), such that all
edges whose buck per bang is more than that threshold are not con-
sidered for matching, while maintaining a (greedy) matching with
large enough sum-utility.
Algorithm 1 THRESHOLD
1: Input: Graph G, Budget B, m = |E(G)|
2: Output: Matching M, Threshold γB
3: A(G) = {γ :
∑
e∈M γu(e) ≤ B, M = GREEDY(G(γ))}
4: γB = max{γ : γ ∈ A(G)}
5: Accept all users in M = GREEDY(G(γB))
Lemma 2. Let M be the matching output by THRESHOLD algo-
rithm with input graphG under budget constraintB. Then u(M) ≥
OPT(B)
3
.
Proof. For convenience we suppress the dependence on B when-
ever its not essential to do so. Decompose the optimal fractional
matching solution OPT = {OPT+ ∪OPT−}, where OPT+ con-
tains edges of OPT that have b(e) > γB , and OPT− contains
edges of OPT that have b(e) ≤ γB . Similarly, let OPT(γB) be the
optimal fractional matching on subgraph G(γB) ⊆ G, where γB
is the output threshold from the THRESHOLD algorithm with graph
G. By definition of optimal matching, u(OPT−) ≤ u(OPT(γB)).
Moreover, for M, the output matching from THRESHOLD algorithm
with graph G, we have u(M) ≥ u(OPT(γB))
2
, since M is a greedy
matching on G(γ) (subgraph with all edges having b(e) ≤ γB).
Therefore, u(M) ≥ u(OPT
−)
2
.
All edges e = (ℓ, r) ∈ OPT+, have b(e) = cℓ
u(e)
> γB . Thus,
u(OPT+) =
∑
e=(ℓ,r)∈OPT+ x(ℓ)u(e) <
∑
e=(ℓ,r)∈OPT+
x(ℓ)cℓ
γB
,
where x(ℓ) are fractional weights in the optimal solution. More-
over, the total budget constraint of B (∑e=(ℓ,r)∈OPT x(ℓ)cℓ ≤ B)
implies that u(OPT+) < B
γB
. Assuming that the budget constraint
is tight with the THRESHOLD algorithm (∑e∈M γBu(e) = B),
u(M) = B
γB
. Therefore, u(OPT+) < u(M). Combining this with
u(M) ≥ u(OPT
−)
2
, we have u(M∗) ≤ 3u(OPT) as required.
If the budget constraint is not tight with the THRESHOLD al-
gorithm, then under our assumption that the maximum utility of
any edge is umax, and by the definition of THRESHOLD algo-
rithm that finds the largest feasible γ, the leftover budget B −∑
e∈M γBu(e) is no more than γBumax, and similar argument
gives us that u(OPT) ≤ (3 + o(1))u(M).
We next state a critical lemma for analyzing the proposed online
version of THRESHOLD, ON.
Lemma 3. Let G = (L ∪ R,E) and F ⊆ G, such that F =
(L\L′ ∪ R,E′), and the edge set E′ is such that all edges inci-
dent on left vertices in set L′ are removed simultaneously, while all
edges incident on L\L′ are retained as it is. Then
u(GREEDY(G)) ≥ u(GREEDY(F )).
Moreover
u(GREEDY(G(γ1))) ≥ u(GREEDY(G(γ2)))
for γ1 ≥ γ2, and u(GREEDY(G(γ))) ≥ u(GREEDY(F (γ))).
Proof. For arbitrary subgraph F ⊆ G, u(GREEDY(G)) may or
may not be larger than u(GREEDY(F )). However, when a left ver-
tex is removed (by deleting all edges incident to it), the proof of
claim 1 follows standard procedure by showing that the weight of
the edge incident on any right vertex in GREEDY(G) is at least
as much as in GREEDY(F ). Detailed proof is omitted for lack of
space. For the second and third claim, note that an edge e incident
on left vertex ℓ is removed in G(γ) compared to G, if b(e) > γ
or equivalently if u(e) < cℓ
γ
. Recall that the cost of any edge only
depends on the index of its left vertex. Hence, if edge e = (ℓ, r) is
removed from G to obtain G(γ), then all the edges e′ incident on
ℓ with utility u(e′) < u(e) are also removed. So essentially, edges
are removed monotonically from G to produce G(γ). So the proofs
for the second and third claim follow similarly to the first.
The importance of Lemma 3 is in showing that THRESHOLD is
solvable in polynomial time and the threshold γB is monotonic. We
prove the two claims as follows.
Lemma 4. THRESHOLD is solvable in polynomial time.
Algorithm THRESHOLD involves finding a maximum in Step
4. We will show that one can use bisection to solve this max-
imization. We would like to note that if u(GREEDY(G(γ))) ≯
u(GREEDY(F (γ))), then finding this maximum is non-trivial.
Proof. From the definition of Algorithm THRESHOLD its clear that
if any γ ∈ A(G), then γB ≥ γ. Hence the key step is to show
that if any γ /∈ A(G), then γB < γ which follows from the second
claim of Lemma 3, that u(GREEDY(G(γ1))) ≥ u(GREEDY(G(γ2)))
for γ1 ≥ γ2. Therefore, if for any γ /∈ A(G), then for any γ′ > γ,
γ′ /∈ A(G). Hence we can use bisection to find the maximum.
The main and critical difference between the THRESHOLD and
UNIFORMMECHANISM [4] algorithm is the maximization step that
ensures the following monotonicity property on γB (Lemma 5) that
allows us to make the algorithm online using the SAMPLEAND-
PRICE algorithm [8].
Lemma 5. Let G = (L∪R,E) and F = (L\L′ ∪R,E′), where
the edge set E′ is such that all edges incident on left vertices in set
L′ are removed simultaneously, while all edges incident on L\L′
are retained as it is. Then γB(F ) ≥ γB(G).
Proof. From Lemma 3,
u(M(F (γ))) ≤ u(GREEDY(G(γ))). (1)
Let the threshold and the matching obtained by running THRESH-
OLD on G with budget B be γB(G) = γ, and M(G), respec-
tively, where γ ≤ B
u(GREEDY(G(γ))) . Now we consider F (γ) as
the input graph to the THRESHOLD with same budget constraint
B. Since γ ≤ B
u(GREEDY(G(γ))) , from (1), clearly, γ ≤ Bu(M(F (γ)) ,
and
∑
e∈M(F (γ)) γu(e) ≤ B. Therefore, γ ∈ A(F ), which by
definition of γB(F ) implies γB(F ) ≥ γ.
We now describe our online algorithm ON, that produces the
matching MON and associated payments for left vertices that are
part of matching MON. The idea behind ON is as follows:
• Do not match any of the first half of left vertices (called
the observation phase), and only use them to run the offline
THRESHOLD algorithm and find the threshold γ1/2 and the
matching M1/2 with budget B′ = Bβ . Recall that β > 1,
hence we are finding a conservative estimate for γ1/2.
• For any right vertex r ∈ M1/2, set its value v(r) to be the
weight (utility) of the matched edge in M1/2. We are assum-
ing that |L1/2| is large enough compared to the number of
right vertices and all right vertices are matched by THRESH-
OLD in offline phase using the first half of the left vertices,
i.e., v(r) > 0, ∀ r ∈ R.
• In the decision phase, starting with the arrival of |L/2| +
1th left vertex, delete all edges that have buck per bang b(e)
larger than γ1/2. Among the surviving edges, match the left
vertex to the right vertex with the largest weight (utility) that
is higher than the value of the right vertex found from M1/2,
if any.
Algorithm 2 ON Algorithm
1: Input: L set of left vertices/users that arrive sequentially, R
set of right vertices, Budget B′ = B
β
,
2: L1/2 = first half of left vertices L
3: Run THRESHOLD on G1/2 = (L1/2 ∪ R,E1/2) with budget
B′ to obtain γ1/2 , γB′(G1/2) and matching M1/2
4: for each right vertex r ∈ R do
5: Set value v(r) := u(e) for e = (ℓ, r) ∈ M1/2
6: end for
7: %Decision Phase
8: MON = ∅
9: for every new left vertex ℓ ∈ L\L1/2 do,
10: %Pruning:
11: Delete all edges e = (ℓ, r), r ∈ R s.t. b(e) > γ1/2
12: Let e⋆ = argmaxe=(ℓ,r),r∈R,u(e)>v(r) u(e) be the largest
weight (utility) edge after pruning with weight larger than the
value of the corresponding right vertex.
13: Let e⋆ be incident on right vertex r⋆
14: if MON ∪ {e⋆} is a matching then
15: MON = MON ∪ {e⋆}
16: Pay pℓ = βγ1/2v(r⋆) to user ℓ
17: else
18: Let ℓ be permanently unmatched
19: end if
20: end for
• For each matched left vertex ℓ, pay p = βγ1/2v(r), where
r is the right vertex to which the accepted edge from ℓ is
matched.
We now compute the expected utilities of matchings M1/2 and
MON, where the expectation is over the uniformly random left ver-
tex arrival sequences.
Lemma 6. E{u(M1/2)} ≥ u(OPT(Bβ ))/12.
Proof. Let B′ = B
β
. Let G = (L ∪ R,E) be the full graph, while
G1/2 = (L1/2(σ) ∪ R,E1/2(σ)), be the graph consisting of only
the first half of left vertices that depends on arrival sequence σ.
SinceG1/2 ⊆ G, from Lemma 5, we have γB′(G1/2) ≥ γB′(G).
Thus, all the edges of G(γB′(G)) that are incident on left vertices
L1/2(σ) are also present in the pruned graph G1/2(γB′(G1/2)).
Let the greedy matching over the ’bigger’ graph G(γB′(G)) be
M(G). Let the subset of edges of M(G) that are incident on left
vertices belonging to L1/2(σ) be M(G)fh. Let the optimal frac-
tional matching on G1/2(γB′(G1/2)) be OPT(B′)1/2, By defini-
tion, we have
u(OPT(B′)1/2) ≥ u(M(G)fh).
Since we are considering the uniformly random arrival model for
left vertices, i.e., L1/2 is obtained by sampling each left vertex of L
with probability 1
2
, we have E {u(M(G)fh)} ≥ u(M(G))2 and hence
E
{
u(OPT(B′)1/2)
}
≥
u(M(G))
2
. (2)
Moreover, since THRESHOLD computes a greedy matching over
G1/2(γB′(G1/2)), we have u(M1/2) ≥
u(OPT(B′)1/2)
2
for any re-
alization σ. From Lemma 2, we already know that u(M(G)) ≥
OPT(B′)
3
. Hence from (2), we haveE{u(M1/2)} ≥ u(OPT(B′))/12.
Lemma 7. E{u(MON)} ≥ E{u(M1/2)}/2.
Proof. Consider the graph G(γB′(G)), where γB′ is the output
threshold of THRESHOLD algorithm with budget B′ and graph
G1/2. Then the setting of value for each right vertex, and the greedy
selection of edges with weights larger than the value of right ver-
tices in the decision phase of ON is identical to running SAMPLE-
ANDPRICE algorithm (Algorithm 3) on graph G(γB′(G)) with
p =
|L1/2|
|L|
= 1
2
, and hence it follows from Lemma 2.5 [8] that
E{u(MON)} ≥ E{u(M1/2)}/2.
Algorithm 3 SAMPLEADPRICE Algorithm
1: Input: G = (L ∪R,E) and p ∈ [0, 1]
2: k ← Binomial(|L|, p)
3: Let L′ be the first k vertices of L
4: M1 ← GREEDY(G′), with G′ = (L′ ∪R,E′)
5: for each r ∈ R do
6: Set v(r) = u(e) of the edge e incident to r in M1
7: end for
8: M ← ∅
9: for each subsequent ℓ ∈ L\L′ do
10: Let e = (ℓ, r) be the highest-weight edge with u(e) ≥
v(r)
11: if M ∪ {e} is a matching then
12: M = M ∪ {e}
13: end if
14: end for
The following theorem is the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1. Algorithm ON is 24β-competitive, satisfies the budget
constraint and is truthful.
Proof. The 24β-competitiveness of ON follows from combining
Lemma 1,6, and 7. The budget feasibility and truthfulness are
shown in Lemma 8 and 9, respectively.
Lemma 8. Algorithm ON satisfies the payment budget constraint,
and payment pℓ ≥ cℓ for any selected left vertex ℓ.
Proof. Let γ1/2 = γB′(G1/2) for simplicity. For a selected left
vertex ℓ, its buck per bang cℓ
u(e)
≤ γ1/2 and u(e) > v(r), where
e = (ℓ, r) is the selected edge. From the definition of β, βv(r) ≥
u(e). Thus, pℓ = γB′βv(r) ≥ γ1/2u(e) and hence pℓ ≥ cℓ.
From the definition of algorithm THRESHOLD, we know that the
output threshold γB′ ∈ A(G) for the offline phase (first half of left
vertices) of ON, and hence
γ1/2
∑
e∈M1/2
u(e) ≤ B′. (3)
Since the value of any right vertex r is v(r) = u(e) where e =
(ℓ, r) ∈ M1/2. Therefore, from (3), we have that
∑
r:e=(ℓ,r)∈M1/2
v(r) ≤
B′
γ1/2
. (4)
Clearly, in the decision phase of ON, at most one left vertex is se-
lected for each right vertex, and the payment made is pℓ = βγB′v(r)
if ℓ is matched, and pℓ = 0 otherwise. Thus, the total payment
made ∑
ℓ,e=(ℓ,r)∈Mon
pℓ ≤
∑
r,e=(ℓ,r)∈M1/2
βγ1/2v(r).
Thus, from (4), we get that∑ℓ,e=(ℓ,r)∈Mon pℓ ≤ B.
Next, we show the most important property of ON, its truthful-
ness. Towards that end, we will use the Myerson’s Theorem [2].
Theorem 2. [2] A reverse auction is truthful if and only if:
• The selection rule is monotone. If a user ℓ wins the auction
by bidding cℓ, it would also win the auction by bidding an
amount c′ℓ, where c′ℓ < cℓ.
• Each winner is paid a critical amount. If a winning user
submits a bid greater than this critical value, it will not get
selected.
Lemma 9. ON is a truthful online algorithm.
Proof. As stated before, the considered problem is a special case
of a reverse auction. Thus to ensure that ON is truthful, we show
that both the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied. The monotone
condition is easy to check, since in the decision phase, if any left
vertex reduces its bid, then clearly its buck per bang b(e) decreases,
and hence it is still accepted if it was accepted before.
The second condition of payment being critical is also satisfied,
shown as follows. Note that the payment made by ON to a selected
left vertex ℓ is pℓ = βγB′(G1/2)v(r), e = (ℓ, r) ∈ Mon, where
the right vertex index r is such that utility u(e), e = (ℓ, r) is largest
among the unmatched right vertices at the time of arrival of vertex
ℓ that have an edge to left vertex ℓ, and u(e) > v(r).
Recall that umax
umin
≤ β, hence u(e)
v(r)
≤ β, where e = (ℓ, r).
Now, if suppose the bid cℓ of left vertex ℓ is more than pℓ =
βγB′(G1/2)v(r), then since u(e) ≤ βv(r), buck per bang of left
vertex ℓ, cℓ/u(e) > γB′(G1/2). Moreover, since u(e) > u(e′)
for all edges e′ incident on unmatched right vertices from ℓ at the
arrival of left vertex ℓ, we have that cℓ/u(e′) > γB′(G1/2). Thus,
all edges out of left vertex ℓ incident on currently unmatched right
vertices are removed in the pruning stage of the decision phase, and
hence vertex ℓ cannot be selected.
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